Global Civil War

April 2007

Introduction
Terrorism is perhaps the greatest threat to the nation-state system the world has ever seen. Though it has a long history – especially depending on how you define it – terrorism has transformed and flourished in recent years (Weber, et al, 2007; Satanovsky, 2006; Kudryavtsev, et al, 2005). This terrorism renaissance has occurred almost simultaneously with the era of globalization – another phenomenon, many argue, that threatens the primacy and legitimacy of states as actors on the world stage. The development of a new international or global political power structure and the concurrent metamorphosis of the method we call terrorism, which is used to attack and delegitimize existing power structures, poses various questions: Is this just a specious correlation, or is there a causal relationship between the two phenomena? If there is a causal relationship, how have the processes of globalization encouraged and/or facilitated the growth of terrorism? Furthermore, how do terrorists use the processes of globalization to achieve their ends? And, perhaps most important, how can the forces of globalization – a seemingly irreversible phenomenon – be tailored and used in such a way to defeat or at least enervate the forces of terrorism? This paper will attempt to answer these questions.

I took it for granted that the answer to the first of these questions – is there a causal relationship between the phenomenon of globalization and the flourishing of terrorism – was a resounding “Yes!” But what does one mean by “flourishing”? Analyzing statistical data related to terrorism is a daunting task – confusing at best, an exercise in futility at worst. This is because most terrorism data are definition-dependent and thus vary widely. Nonetheless, I chose to tentatively trust the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism’s (MIPT) comprehensive database found at http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp. After generating various graphs from data representing the number of incidents of terrorism from 1968 – the year some analysts, according to Barry Cooper (2005), point to as “the beginning of the new era” of terrorism – to 2006, I came to realize that terrorist incidents have actually not increased.* In fact, according to the State Department, St. Andrews University, and the RAND corporation, the number of terrorist attacks actually declined between the 1970s and 1990s (Cooper, 2005). Thus, if one defines “flourishing” as simply increasing in number, then there is no causal relationship because there is not even a “flourishing.” But, even though there has been no substantial increase in terrorist incidents since the advent of the modern era of globalization, terrorism – especially of the transnational Islamic kind* – has flourished in two other important ways: lethality* and appeal. And this does not bode well for the future.

But before I discuss the complex relationship between globalization and terrorism, I must define precisely how I use these complex and controversial terms. For the sake of brevity and clarity, I’ve decided to simplify these concepts as much as possible. Globalization in my lexicon is made up of processes that increase the connectivity of people across the globe – be it politically, economically, socially, or otherwise. These processes could be said to have always existed in some form, but after World War II, technology, which is so often propelled by wars, provided us with the means to increase our connectivity like never before: rocket-propulsion technology matured into orbiting satellites, thus allowing telephone communications to become global; air travel became cheaper and faster and thus commonplace; and, finally, in the 1970s came the microchip, which led to the internet (Langhorne, 2001). These technological advances allow for the “increased mobility of people, capital and goods, and ideas and information across national borders” (Adamson, 2005: 33), the redistribution of political power, and the concomitant re-conceptualization of sovereignty that have come to define today’s globalization. And though many argue – and make a strong case (Held, 2003) – that terrorism must not be defined narrowly as political violence committed (primarily) against civilians by non-state actors for political ends, for the purposes of this paper, which focuses on the dichotomy of state vs. non-state power, such a narrow, even if incomplete, definition is warranted. Note: As my analysis of globalization and terrorism takes us deeper into their nature, I will unpack and narrow these definitions accordingly.

This paper is organized in the following manner. In the first section, I will discuss how the processes of globalization cause terrorism. I do this knowing that it is practically impossible to assign a single cause to a person’s actions: Globalization is one of many causes – in some cases a “necessary” cause, in others a “sufficient” cause – that pushes people towards terrorism as a means of political expression. In the second section, I will discuss how the processes of globalization facilitate terrorism, i.e. the weakening of states through globalization. This is distinct from the third section, which discusses how the processes of globalization are used as a means of terrorism: The former describes the structural and technological changes that create conditions conducive to 1) terrorism’s appeal, 2) the ability of terrorists to organize, and 3) their ability to carry out attacks; the latter describes the ways in which terrorists utilize these favorable conditions. The fourth section describes the important, even if parenthetical, problems terrorism poses to democratic states and democracy itself as a political reality. The conclusion describes the ways in which individuals and states can use, tailor, and, perhaps, totally reshape globalization to protect themselves from terrorism and defeat the ideologies that favor this method of political expression.

Globalization as Cause of Terrorism

- A terrorist organization needs a story to attract resources and recruits. Oftentimes,
mere frustration over political, economic, or religious conditions is not enough. Al Qaeda
understands that, and, for that reason, it weaves a narrative of global jihad against a
“modernization,” “Westernization,” and a “Judeo-Christian” threat. (Weber, 2007)

The primary effect of globalization that is one of the many root causes of certain terrorist acts is what I call a “perceived cultural threat.” This threat, coupled with the political turmoil and economic instability associated with globalization, as Barry Cooper explains, elicits a violent response: “For people whose tradition is in tatters and who are exposed to contextless images of a materially comfortable west, force has an obvious appeal.” (Cooper, 2005) This is especially true of today’s most virulent ideology that embraces terrorism – what I call “jihadism.”

Globalization, as much as it seeks homogeneity, cannot and will not easily discard the myriad differences that exist among communities of people. The fact that individuals and communities all around the world are more exposed to other parts of the world more often than ever, and the fact that this exposure is in some cases seemingly being imposed on them (which to some smacks of imperialism in a new form) means that they have to react in some way: They must either accept it and adapt to it, or reject it and try to ignore it.* However, globalization is by nature “in-your-face” and thus ignoring it is nearly impossible; rejection, then, must come in the form of direct opposition, especially for people who do not have the means or the desire to try to influence it and mold it in their own way. No doubt, it is fair to say that not all people want what globalization has to offer, whether their perception of it is right or wrong: What promoters of globalization see as an opportunity for all people to join “modernity,” others see as a threat to their way of life.

Modernity, which is undoubtedly a term with a Western bias, affects people in multifarious ways. “Openness and economic interdependence,” says Horst Kohler, managing director of the IMF, “can exacerbate the spillovers of economic shocks across countries, and amplify domestic economic problems.” (Santiago, 2004). Moreover, the market forces that drive globalization not only force standardization in business but also promote certain narrow cultural values. Of course, whether or not you accept globalization’s homogenizing tendencies all depends on what you perceive as the values it promotes and how you perceive it affects your daily life. The fact that the West – and America in particular – is the primary proponent of globalization means that its culture is exposed the most to the rest of the world. Despite the myriad differences within Western culture itself, the nature of the market usually allows for only the most watered-down or “trendy” aspects of it to be exported – the Nikes, the Hollywood blockbusters, the soap operas, the pop-music bands, etc. – thus perpetuating the perception that the West is seeking to homogenize cultures to resemble its own homogenized form. That, coupled with the structural changes that accompany periods of societal transition and the concomitant political upheaval that follows (effects of globalization the entire world feels to varying degrees), lends credence to the notion that local cultures are under attack. Western foreign policies perceived as aggressive and unbridled capitalism perceived as amoral or immoral further confirm this notion, making globalization appear as an insidious, multi-headed monster that just grows bigger and more powerful with time.

Many scholars warn against characterizing globalization as “Westernization,” or “universalisation,” or “homogenization,” (Scholte, 2005; Berger, 2002; Ferguson, et al, 2004) because such terms do not take into account various nuances of the current era. But, such arguments will not convince people who grew up isolated and now see foreign influences infiltrating almost every aspect of their lives. Those who perceive modernity as having ruined their way of life seek revenge. And today, political revenge has taken on a religious veil in the form of jihadism. Barry Cooper explains, “when cultures are changed, challenged, transformed, mocked, and perhaps suppressed, especially if this happens at the hands of outsiders, the secularization that has unavoidably accompanied global modernity is experienced by religious communities as an assault and the most important source of damage.” (2005) Thus, economic, political, and social revitalization only appears possible through religion: The more an aspect of a person’s identity seems to be under attack, the more that aspect is precious – and this is especially true of religion.

Virginia Held describes the “clash” of globalization and traditional Islamic culture thus: “The inability of traditional Islamic patterns of life to withstand the onslaught of capitalist culture and Western images may well be experienced as humiliating.” (Held, 2003) And, in her view, “the most salient factor in causing terrorism seem[s] to me to be humiliation.” (Held, 2003: 61) Hence the appeal of Osama bin Laden’s rhetoric when he says “[s]ince World War I and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, Muslims have been humiliated,” (Cooper, 2005) and cites American foreign policy – of which the creation of Israel and promoting globalization are integral parts – as the primary cause of this. In order to unite the ummah*, the Jihadists want to make the Muslim world see and feel this humiliation, so that the struggle of Jihad is thought of as a universal struggle – the duty of all Muslims.

I must digress here a bit in order to focus on what I have termed “jihadism.” Ribhi I. Salhi, a political science professor at Roosevelt University, writes extensively on the internal logic of jihadi groups like al-Qaeda – their ideology and their motives. In a paper entitled “Borderless Terror in [a] Global World: The Driving Forces of Building al-Qaeda,” Salhi asserts that these groups “have not been pleased by the politics of their political regimes, by the politics of the international community, and by the politics of great powers in their regions.” (Salhi, 2004: 6) He further points out that Western involvement in the internal affairs of Muslim countries is seen as imperialism and that “radical Muslim rhetoric is oriented to resist the Western domination in their region.” (Salhi, 2004: 6) The irony of the United States’ relations with Middle Eastern governments is that “[s]ome radical Islamic forces have considered their autocratic regime [as] another way to serve the Western interests, which has caused the country to be in [the] hands of imperialism…” An increase in transborder terrorism is thus a logical consequence of an increase in transborder political and economic ties: The coterie of enemies grows to include those who support your national enemies from abroad, whether directly or indirectly. Eventually, as politico-economic ties grow ever stronger, the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” will blur because they are all part of the same system – the neo-liberal, Western dominated system – which then renders any piece of that system a legitimate target, worthy of destruction.

The rise of religious terrorism, then, can be seen as a consequence of globalization’s perceived threat to culture. Extreme fundamentalism among certain Muslims is a “new identity movement shaped by…globalization.” (Packer, 2006) Terrorism, which has always been the weapon of the weak against the strong, seems to many to be the only means through which this threat to culture – an enemy that is vastly more powerful in terms of military strength – can be defeated and the purity of tradition can be restored. Because religion is itself a sort of “globalizing” force – one that is not confined by borders – it is a natural and powerful rival to the current form of globalization, a way for those who reject globalization to completely change it precisely because they can’t ignore it. And because globalization is continuously breaking down borders either physically (as in the European Union) or abstractedly through developments in and the wide availability of technology (as in Cyberspace and the ease of travel), there is less concrete authority to deal with international threats. All this, coupled with deadlier weapons in the hands of individuals, has culminated into the greatest threat the states system has ever faced: transnational organizations driven by religion using the same technology that has spawned globalization to cause mass death and reshape the world in the terrorists’ image. This is an entirely new terrorism, specific to the modern era of globalization.

To the avid followers of jihadist ideology, the processes of globalization are exactly that evil prophesized in their holy texts – that evil which must be fought in order to bring about the apocalypse and thus a new world order of peace and righteousness.* (Cooper, 2005; Satanovsky, 2006)

Globalization as Facilitator of Terrorism

- The globalisation of political mobilisation and contention, like the globalisation of economic production, transforms the interests of, and the international environment inhabited by, states. Political resources become partially deterritorialised, accessible to non-state actors beyond the state and open to mobilisation by organisational structures that stretch across national boundaries. (Adamson, 2005: 33)

Globalization can be seen as a process that integrates societies into a single network. By network, I mean a set of connections that depend on and function in concert with one another. However, this process is not complete; nor, perhaps, will it ever be. And herein lies the problem.
Steven Weber, writing in Foreign Policy Magazine, describes the problem thus: “In an increasingly networked world, places that fall between the networks are very dangerous places—and there will be more ungoverned zones when there is only one network to join.” (Weber, et al, 2007) That is, the more the world is connected, the more dangerous the remnants of the bygone era of tribal, localized, and isolated communities will be because they will not be governed – at least not by the norms of the rest of the world. But it’s worse than that. As I mentioned before, it’s nearly impossible to be completely unconnected to the globalizing world in some way. What’s more, even if you are completely unconnected, it’s very easy to get connected: Globalization always has its arms wide open. And this, Weber explains, is the main advantage that terrorists have because of globalization:

…in a highly connected world, the pieces that fall between the networks
are increasingly shut off from the benefits of connectivity. These problems
fester in the form of failed states, mutate like pathogenic bacteria, and, in
some cases, reconnect in subterranean networks such as al Qaeda. The
truly dangerous places are the points where the subterranean networks
touch the mainstream of global politics and economics. What made
Afghanistan so dangerous under the Taliban was not that it was a failed state.
It wasn't. It was a partially failed and partially connected state that worked the
interstices of globalization through the drug trade, counterfeiting, and terrorism.
(Weber, et al, 2007)

Thus, whether by choice or by disenfranchisement, people who are not part of the network have the “luxury” of popping in and out of it only to take what they need from it and then can re-submerge themselves beneath the watchful eye of open society.

Furthermore, the processes of globalization that have and continue to reshape the global political structure, especially in regards to the permeability of once concrete borders, create the ideal circumstances for transnational terrorists, as well as transnational criminals, to achieve their ends. Previously, the state had the power and resources to control what happened within its borders and what approached it borders (in theory, of course). But, globalization means that states find it in their interests to conduct international trade and attract foreign direct investment, which makes states more dependent on and interconnected to each other. It also means that people migrate more than ever, creating new bonds in foreign lands while maintaining bonds with their home country, which in turn means people’s loyalties are not confined to state borders. Furthermore, the information revolution, which could be said to be the defining characteristic of globalization (Langhorne, 2001), means that states no longer have a monopoly on information, perhaps today’s most valuable resource (though oil, if not tied, is not too far behind). Indeed, as Richard Langhorne asserts in his book entitled The Coming of Globalization, “[t]he technological advances in communications have vastly increased the significance of the economic asset represented by knowledge…” (17) All these factors weaken the ability of states to control their own people – because their own people are now more than ever connected to the rest of the world, a world that does not respect state borders.

The boom in communication and transportation technology has also left states – particularly open and democratic ones – unable to control the speed with which their people’s lives move. The world is now “smaller,” thus rendering territorial sovereignty, which is inherently tied to the ability of the state to project its power through communication and transportation (Langhorne, 2001), in limbo. “A state's sovereignty,” says Steven Lee, “lies, in part, in its having the authority and the ability to protect its citizens from harmful outside forces.” (Lee, 2006: 242) But, as the economy, politics, and society become ever more transnational, so do a state’s “problems.” These transnational problems – such as global warming, the volatility of global markets, mass migration, and, of course, terrorism – require transnational solutions, and, therefore, states are no longer capable of providing their citizens with the ideal conditions of order and opportunity or of protecting them against internal and external threats alone.

Even distinguishing between “internal” and “external” is no longer a simple matter. “[T]he combination of increased levels of globalisation and the emergence of new networks of violence,” says Fiona Adamson, “is creating a fundamental shift in the international security environment, in which the distinction between internal and external security threats is increasingly blurred.” (Adamson, 2005: 31) The existence of sleeper cells illustrates the point. Today, a group of people – typically thought to be made up of foreigners or immigrants; but, as the 7/7 London attacks show, people who commit terrorist attacks against the West can be homegrown too – living within the boundaries of a state’s system, may be given orders to commit a terrorist attack through global communication networks that link the group to a leader halfway around the world. In such a circumstance, internal and external are one and the same threat.

This technology, which states, businesses, and citizens use to conduct their global affairs, also allows what Adamson calls “political entrepreneurs” to indoctrinate and mobilize like-minded individuals: “The availability of satellite television and other media outlets means that immigrants, travellers or tourists can remain linked to a virtual identity community that transcends any particular geographic locale.” (Adamson, 2005: 36) In the case of terrorist groups, the ability to be “linked to a virtual identity community” provides the perfect conditions to recruit, spread propaganda, and mobilize sleeper cells around the world. After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the dismantling of al-Qaeda’s hierarchical leadership structure, the group, which had always been teach savvy, relied more heavily on cellular phones with global reach, satellite television, and, especially, the internet, and has now become a much more horizontally structured, loosely connected, and independently operating network. The New York Times reports that “…in contrast with the somewhat hierarchical structure of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan before Sept. 11, the group’s leadership is now more diffuse, with several planning hubs working autonomously and not reliant on constant contact with Mr. bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahri, his deputy.” (New York Times, 2007) Many security analysts say this has made al-Qaeda much more dangerous.

In the wake of the decline of the state and the rise of transnational connections and transnational problems, non-governmental, international, and transnational organizations have become increasingly more powerful. These organizations provide solutions to the problems that states cannot address entirely on their own. Of course, without the consent of states and without the cooperation of states most of these organizations would not even be around today, let alone effective. Most international organizations were mothered by states, such as the UN, IMF, and World Bank. Many NGOs were begotten – though in some cases “quietly” – by states as well. Whether this was done out of prescience, necessity, self-interest, or some combination of the three is uncertain, but there is no doubt that these organizations have taken on a life of their own and will over time – if current trends in the global power structure remain – grow in importance and power. Thus, it may be argued that states, which are the primary promoters of globalization, have in some ways created the means to their own destruction – much like globalization itself seems to provide the means for its own destruction. (Baudrillard, quoted in Kellner, 2004) In fact, the proliferation of transnational social movements, which are a certain type of NGO, partly define globalization – and what is al-Qaeda but a violent NGO?

If globalization forces even powerful states to face a decline in their sovereign authority, then the impact is even greater for already weak and/or developing states – particularly ones whose borders were arbitrarily drawn by imperial powers with little regard for or knowledge of ethnic and cultural demographics. Weak and failed states are now a severe threat to the international community. Globalization means that it is in every state’s interest that nations have fully functioning governments so that these governments can provide the basic structure of an organized society within which to conduct business. But some states cannot stand the crippling power that is globalization. It is in these states, as Steven Weber’s quote above pointed out, that terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda flourish. Where there is political turmoil, economic hardship*, and a perceived cultural threat, there is a fertile breeding ground for ideologies that embrace terrorism as a form of political expression. Fiona Adamson describes the danger that weak states in a globalized world pose thus: “…weakly institutionalised states lack the political channels for non-state political entrepreneurs to channel political demands and grievances domestically, thus contributing to the push factors that create incentives for political entrepreneurs to turn to transnational political mobilisation.” (Adamson, 2005: 43)

The conjunction of weak or failed states in regions with political, economic, and social upheaval; a decline in the authority of the international state system; technology that can instantly connect people on any points on earth; and a perceived cultural threat – all these provide individuals with transnational political and/or religious ideologies with the structural, technological, and rhetorical ammunition to mount a powerful insurgency against globalizing states and people – using the very stuff that makes globalization possible to achieve their ends.

Globalization as Means of Terrorism

-“Without a doubt, the Internet is the single most important venue for the radicalization of Islamic youth.” Army Brigadier General John Custer. (CBS News: Sixty Minutes)

There are perhaps few greater joys for a terrorist than to use his enemy’s system against him. The 9/11 attacks are a perfect example of this “joy” being realized. Not only did the highjackers use American-owned commercial airliners as missiles against symbols of American economic and military strength, but they also used cellular phones and the internet to keep in contact, plan, and prepare.

Globalization was once the West’s adoring child, but now it has in many ways become an intransigent teenager, running away from home. Much has been said of the “dark side” of globalization – criminal and inhumane activities that were once confined to state borders. Now these dark realities of life travel the globe through the same networks and processes that carry globalization’s light side. Steven Weber succinctly illustrates this point:

The container ships that carry manufactured Chinese goods to and from the
United States also carry drugs. The airplanes that fly passengers nonstop
from New York to Singapore also transport infectious diseases. And the
Internet has proved just as adept at spreading deadly, extremist ideologies as
it has e-commerce. (Weber, 2007)

Globalization, as I’ve mentioned, is made possible by communication and transportation technology. If one looks carefully at history one will see that with each advance in these technologies came commensurate interconnectedness, e.g. improvements in navigation and ship-building brought Europeans to the “New World,” and the application of the steam engine to sea and land transport and the invention of the electric telegraph brought industrialized states tighter control over their own territory and spurred international trade (Langhorne, 2001). The deregulation of the airline industry, which made air travel much cheaper and thus more accessible to average citizens, and the invention of the internet have had similar revolutionary effects in modern times (Langhorne, 2001). And just like the older technological revolutions, people with nefarious intentions have taken advantage of these modern marvels to achieve their ends.

In fact, according to every article I’ve read on the subject, the internet is the most important organizational tool for jihadist terrorists.* It is used for recruiting, propaganda, communication, brainstorming, glorifying attacks, networking, and, perhaps most important, downloading valuable information such as “instruction manuals and guides to assassination, poison, bomb making,” etc. (Cooper, 2005) Because the internet is easily accessible to anyone with a computer and a modem or with enough change in their pocket to pay for an hour at the local internet café, and because one can post anonymously while potentially being able to speak to millions of people, the internet is a terrorist’s paradise – the perfect tool with which to realize his goals. (Qina, et al, 2007: 71) Jihadist websites have in recent years been flooding cyberspace. Terrorists operate “their own Web sites and online forums, [and] have effectively created their own ‘terrorist news network.’” (Qina, et al, 2007: 71) In fact, if you go to Yahoo! groups and type in “Islam Mujahideen*,” you will get ten results, which include “Jihad News Desk,” “mujahid-e-islam,” “peeer_saheb,” “liberatetheworld,” and “uk_islamic_deen,” (five out of the ten, mind you) all of which – except for the last* – openly pledge allegiance to Osama bin Laden and praise groups such as al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, Hizb’allah, Islamic Jihad, and other groups deemed “terrorist organizations” by the United States. If you type in “jihad,” you will get nearly three hundred results, and though most of these groups are innocuous discussion forums (some are even right-wing “anti-jihad” forums), a good number of them propagate similar views.

But what’s especially interesting is not the amount of websites dedicated to spreading jihadist propaganda and serving as a communication tool among their leaders and foot soldiers – it’s how sophisticated these websites are and how difficult it is to monitor them: “[T]hey emerge overnight, frequently modify their contents, and then swiftly ‘disappear’ by changing their URLs which are later announced via online forums.” (Qina, et al, 2007, citing Weimann, 2004: 72) A study conducted by IT and engineering professors at the University of Maryland, George Washington University, and the University of Arizona compared jihadist websites to U.S. government websites and found that, overall, jihadist websites were as sophisticated as those operated by the U.S. government. (Qina, et al, 2007) The most salient difference between the two was that the jihadists’ “employed a significantly higher level of embedded multimedia techniques, especially images and audio/video clips, to catch the interests of their target audience.” (Qina, et al, 2007: 80) Images and audio/video clips are essential elements of jihadist propaganda, as they are of all propaganda. Furthermore, the study found “[n]on-standard files…that cannot be recognized by the Windows operating system,” which could contain “encrypted information.” (Qina, et al, 2007: 79) These encrypted messages could be orders to mobilize sleeper cells.

The beauty of the internet from the point of view of the terrorists is that they have one-hundred percent control over the media content – the internet has no editorial board – and there is no one to dispute their views or show the proverbial “other side of the story.” Fiona Adamson explains that the internet also allows jihadist terrorist groups to “bypass imams and other traditional authority figures, allowing new independent actors to disseminate their own interpretations of Islam to transnational constituencies around the globe.” (Adamson, 2007, citing Mandaville, 2001: 36) And not only do terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda use the internet for propaganda, communication, recruitment, training, and psychological warfare, but they also use it – as well as many other means – to raise funds. Many jihadist websites have links saying “donate” and many charities and NGOs with links to terrorist groups raise money on the internet and donate it themselves. Al-Qaeda in particular also “uses credit cards and modern banking to move money.” (Weber, et al, 2007) In short, the internet is ungoverned, reaches a wide audience, and virtually allows its users to remain anonymous. But for the latter, globalization can be described quite similarly. Thus, it is no wonder that the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service wrote, “[a]dvanced communications techniques, combined with the ease of international travel, have broadened terrorism’s scope of operations…Computers, modems, and the internet are enhancing the operational capabilities of terrorist organizations.” (Cooper, 2005)

The importance of media coverage in terrorist campaigns has long been establish and so have the psychological effects of images. Al-Qaeda has mastered the art of carefully designing propaganda videos and the internet has given them the ability to indoctrinate anyone anywhere in the world: “If bin Laden didn't have access to global media, satellite communications, and the Internet, he'd just be a cranky guy in a cave.”*

Special Problems for Democracy’s Fight against Terrorism

-…any reduction in civil liberties and the sanctity of the principle (as well as the letter) of the laws on which the United States is founded runs the risk of undermining the inspirational role of the United States as a symbol of democracy. (Matthew, et al, 2005: 226)

Globalization has not only put into question the legitimacy of the state, but also the viability of democracy as a political reality. Richard Langhorne succinctly explains the problem democracies face in light of globalization thus:

Because the exercise of public domestic authority came to be associated almost completely with states, the devices which have been developed to make that authority acceptable to populations have also been linked to the machinery of states. These devices consist of constitutional limitations and other conditions that are imposed on the exercise of power….Democratic systems of government provide further means of mediating power….When power and authority begin to seep away from national governments, they also escape from the controls which have evolved in association with states…Newer sources of globalized power and authority are being exercised without any of the familiar…restraints…This produces global circumstances…described as a democratic deficit. (2001: 40)

As globalization causes more and more aspects of governance to be privatized – including war – and as more interactions between people occur transnationally, the rules and norms which govern both national and international society will become obsolete. Without new rules, who will mind the store?

It is not hard to see how terrorism exacerbates the problem. Most successful counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns – with the possible exception of Britain’s success against the IRA – have involved “harsh techniques, including forced population movements, coercion of locals into security forces, stringent curfews, and even lethal pressure on civilians to take the government side.” (Packer, 2006) However, in a globalized world with “instant media” available to anyone with a television or internet connection, such methods are less viable because they would spark international outrage, thus prompting some sort of intervention.* (Packer, 2006) In democratic societies, such measures are hardly imaginable. Democratic states have to protect their citizens without trampling on their civil liberties. Doing so requires carefully balancing the need to extract information – which obviously includes spying and perhaps interrogation techniques tantamount to torture – with the ideals of privacy, tolerance, and human rights. Because, as I discussed before, there is now little difference between “internal” and “external” threats, effective counterterrorism in any society requires governments to spy on their own citizens. The question is, How can democratic governments effectively root-out terrorists in their midst without causing “collateral damage,” i.e. invading the privacy of innocuous citizens?
In a paper entitled, “The Pendulum Effect: Explaining Shifts in the Democratic Response to Terrorism,” Richard Matthew and George Shambaugh argue that democratic governments such as the United States have inherent safeguards built into their political system and culture that in the long run will protect citizens from government intrusion. Democratic citizens, they argue, tend to be willing to “cede civil liberties to the government” (224) for short periods following a terrorist attack or when there is a perceived immediate threat. Though abuses may – and in fact, will – occur, because of the strength of democratic institutions such as think tanks, an independent press, political watchdog groups, and other private political organizations, democratic citizens have more access to independent information and more opportunities to voice their opinions. (Matthew, et al, 2005: 229)

Moreover, besides having checks and balances within themselves, individual democratic governments, Matthew and Shambaugh note, even check and balance each other: “When one democracy deviates from expected norms or standards of conduct, others will be quick to criticize it.” (230) (This is evidenced by Canada’s, France’s, and Germany’s public spat with the United States over the war in Iraq.) Furthermore, despite the patriotic zeal that followed the 9/11 attacks on the United States, which partly allowed the White House to pass the P.A.T.R.I.O.T. act with little public – or even congressional – scrutiny, “parochial concerns soon reemerge and, as they do, collective action problems undercut the unified push away from the middle and the pendulum swings back from the extreme toward the preferences that reflect those of the median voter in society.” (Matthew, et al, 2005: 227) Even the P.A.T.R.I.O.T. act itself contained a provision which required congress to renew the bill after a period of time when proverbial “cooler heads” would prevail. So, if you buy Matthew’s and Shambaugh’s argument, it seems as though democracy – at least in the United States – is well equipped to face the strains put on it by the threat of transnational terrorism. Of course, whether this remains to be true depends on the continued vigilance of democracy’s citizens.

Conclusion: Globalization as Response to Terrorism?

-“The terrorists find it much easier to operate in a disunited world.” (Satanovsky, 50)

The title of this paper – Global Civil War – sums up the state of the world today: at once coming together and yet falling apart. The quote above sums up the problem with the current effort to defeat terrorism. The implication, then, provides the solution: unity.

Unity as I envision it is not the stuff of quixotic daydreams. It is possible to unify mankind across the globe and still celebrate diversity. It is possible to establish frameworks with which to solve collective problems and still tailor them to the specificities of a given region, country, city, or village. All it takes is an agreement among all that something is not right with the world as it is today and a willingness to forgo traditional restraints that have made this so in favor of radical changes that may –and hopefully will – effect change. I believe such an agreement is a foregone conclusion; the problem is the will to change – and how?

Globalization, as this paper makes abundantly clear, is both a unifying and a divisive force. Some call the divisive side “fragmentation,” (Lundestad, 2004) others call it “tribalization,” (Ronfeldt, 2006) – it is the proverbial “equal and opposite reaction” to global interactions. Jihadist terrorists thrive in the forlorn recesses of modern life. They both promote and take advantage of globalization’s divisive power; and wherever they find disaffected Muslims and undeveloped and desolate lands they establish sanctuary – and begin to plot. No longer can the West neglect any nook of the planet. What happens in the remotest village of the earth may affect the most populous, most civilized, and strongest nation in history. Given today’s technology, “…small groups of terrorists…will soon be able to annihilate thousands and even hundreds of thousands of people, not to mention the panic likely to engulf the whole world.” (Kudryavtsev, et al, 89) Weapons of mass destruction mean the whims of madmen or the utopian dreams of religious zealots are no longer laughable; they in fact may hold the future of existence in their hands.

But how do you satisfy the demands of people who want nothing to do with your system or your way of life? Obviously, speeding up or forcing globalization upon them is not the answer. But, perhaps, a different type of globalization is – one that seeks to address local concerns and preserve traditional ways of life, all the while operating under the same principles that America’s founding fathers and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi and Jesus of Nazareth – and, yes, even the Beatles – preached: love, liberty, justice, and freedom for all!

The devil, of course, is in the details. As the world’s sole superpower, and as the first nation to be officially built upon the above stated principles, the United States of America has a unique opportunity to make it so that future children will not have to hang their heads in shame when they read the history of our generation, as I did when I was a child (and as I still do). Unfortunately, as the leading promoter of globalization, the United States “is so unpopular [around the world]… that being pro-American is a kiss of death [for politicians] in their domestic politics,” (Nye, 2004: 257) and thus foreign “political leaders are unlikely to make concessions to help us.” (Nye, 2004: 257) The perception of the world’s citizens is paramount to the security of the United States – especially if it wants to promote democracy around the world. The government and the American people must be convinced of this before there will be any chance of not only enervating the Jihadists but also improving the lives of billions of people. An American foreign policy based on humanitarianism and social justice is the best means to defeating terrorists in a globalized world.

Before I expand on this idea, which is obviously a long-term objective, I’d like to identify some things that can be done in the short term to combat the threat of transnational Jihadist terrorism. As I made clear in Globalization as a Means of Terrorism, the internet is in many respects Jihad’s headquarters. Governments, with the help of the private sector, must develop more efficient methods of monitoring these websites and tracing their sources. Efforts must be made to hack into these websites and take them down. I do not have the technical expertise to prescribe how this may be done, but more research must be conducted to find out.

Moreover, the CIA is already beginning to use wikis and blogs – “Intellipedia” – to share intelligence within and between agencies so that analysts may more easily “connect the dots”:
To disrupt these new [transnational] plots [which use global communication systems], some intelligence officials concluded, American agents and analysts would need to cooperate just as fluidly – trading tips quickly among agents and agencies… [Matthew] Burton wrote… “Analytical puzzles, like terror plots, are often too piecemeal for individual brains to put together. Having our documents aware of each other would be like hooking several brains up in a line, so that each one knows what the others know, making the puzzle much easier to solve”… If analysts and agents were encouraged to post personal blogs and wikis on Intelink – linking to their favorite analyst reports or the news bulletins they considered important – then mob intelligence would take over. (Thompson, 2006)

Of course, Intellipedia has its drawbacks, but, as the 9/11 report suggested, sharing intelligence is a vital component of counterterrorism policy. These techniques must continue and be expanded.

Furthermore, the West must continue to support religious/inter-faith dialogues with Muslims around the world, improve educational programs in Muslim countries, and increase student-exchange programs between Western and Muslim countries.

The war in Iraq, whether you agreed with the decision to go in or not, is a vital part of the war on terror simply because, in a globalizing world, anything the United States does is disseminated to citizens around the world and can and will be used as propaganda against it – if it continues to commit blunders, to put it mildly. “…[I]n a media age,” writes Douglas Kellner, “images and spectacle are impossible to control and a media spectacle concocted to be a triumphal display of US military power can easily reverse into a spectacle of US arrogance, brutality, and malfeasance.” (Kellner, 2004) I will not go into detail as to what I think should be done in Iraq, but it is crucial that the U.S. not “stay the course” so that it may begin the long process of completely reshaping its image in the world, which will only occur if it completely reshapes its foreign policy philosophy.

The long-term objective is to fundamentally change the world system using the extant processes of globalization already moving the world into uncharted territory. We must steer a new course. Virginia Held writes, “[t]errorists often believe…that violence is the only course of action open to them that can advance their political objectives. It is the responsibility of those who are able to do so to make this assessment untrue.” (Held, 2003) This does not mean negotiating with terrorists or trying to get Osama bin Laden to sit down and drink a beer with George Bush; it means improving the lives of the millions of Muslims – many of whom live under totalitarian regimes supported by the same United States government that claims to stand for democracy and justice – who are sitting on the fence, unsure of whether bin Laden’s words are true or worthy to follow.

To do this, governments and businesses must take steps to “ensure that globalization works for all and is an effective tool to alleviate poverty. This requires efforts at both the national and the international levels.” (Santiago, 2004) Benjamin Barber takes this idea further: “To create a just and inclusive world in which all citizens are stakeholders is the first objective of a rational strategy against terrorism . . .” (Held, quoting Barber, 2003: 28) Global governance must be strengthened if this is to be materialized. Since states are slowly losing power anyway, they may need to give up even more sovereignty in order to ensure their survival. Steven Lee explains it thus:

The strengthening in global governance will be chosen or at least accepted by states because they will see it as the most effective way to deal with terrorism, and it will seem a good deal from their point of view to surrender some of their sovereignty to international law rather than to tolerate its surrender to global disorder. States may choose greater global order as a remedy for increasing global disorder, with their sovereignty being squeezed in the middle. (Lee, 2006: 242)

Steven Lee, as well as many others, also advocate for a transnational police force to track terrorists as they move between borders and interdict them before they strike. Of course, there are numerous concerns that must be addressed if this is to work – but now is the time to begin addressing them. Besides, there are already many examples to use as precedents: Interpol and the Atlas Network in Europe.*

Furthermore, many well-respected foreign policy thinkers, including Joseph Nye, Steven Weber, and Bob Bradley, warn against a so-called American empire. Nye stresses the need for America to exercise what he calls “soft power” – the ability to get other nations to want to emulate you and thus cooperate with you because they respect your culture, strength, and conduct. “The United States,” explains Nye, “cannot bomb al Qaeda cells in Hamburg, Kuala Lumpur, or Detroit. Success against them depends on close civilian cooperation…America's partners cooperate partly out of self-interest, but the inherent attractiveness of U.S. policies can and does influence the degree of cooperation.” (Nye, 2004: 258) In other words, the United States cannot protect its citizens against terrorism if it does not earnestly work with other nations and international institutions: “Rather than engage in futile efforts at ignoring the UN or changing its architecture, we should improve our underlying bilateral diplomacy with the other major powers and use the UN in the practical ways in which it can help with the new strategy.” (Nye, 2004: 269) Weber, furthermore, ties the rise of al-Qaeda and the current rise in chaos and disorder across the world to the preponderance of the United States: “…[I]t's not globalization that turned Osama bin Laden from a small-time Saudi dissident into the symbolic head of a radical global movement. What created Osama bin Laden was the predominance of American power.” (Weber, et al, 2007)

In every war, governments and people have to make sacrifices. This generation of Americans is faced with a monumental question: Are you willing to cede your position as the world’s sole superpower if such a move will ensure your security? Only an answer in the affirmative will allow the U.S. to protect not only its prestige but also its citizens and win today’s “global civil war.” Only a truly flat world with strong international institutions and robust international cooperation can ensure the survival of the state system – though in a weakened form – and ensure stability and prosperity for the world’s citizens.


Works Cited
Adamson, Fiona B. "Globalisation, Transnational Political Mobilisation, and Networks of Violence." Cambridge Review of International Affairs 18 (2005): 31-49.
Barber, Benjamin. “Jihad vs. McWorld.” The Atlantic Monthly 269, No. 3 (1992).
Berger, Peter L. “Introduction: The Cultural Dynamics of Globalization.” Many Globalizations Oxford U Press, 2002: 1-16.
Cooper, Barry. "Terrorism and Globalization." Perspectives on Global Development & Technology 4.3 (2005): 543-75.
Ferguson, Yale, and Mansbach, Richard. Remapping Global Politics: History’s Revenge and Future Shock. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Held, Virginia. "Terrorism and War." Journal of Ethics 8.1 (2004): 59-75.
Kellner, Douglas. “Baudrillard, Globalization and Terrorism: Some Comments on Recent Adventures of the Image and Spectacle on the Occasion of Baudrillard’s 75th Birthday.” http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/baudrillardglobalizationterror.pdf (July 2004)
Kudryavtsev, Vladimir, Viktor Luneyev, and Viktor Petrishchev. "Terrorism and Organized Crime Under Globalization Conditions." Social Sciences 36 (2005): 84-94.
Langhorne, Richard. The Coming of Globalization. Palgrave Publishers Ltd., 2001.
Lee, Steven. "International Governance and the Fight Against Terrorism." Ethics & International Affairs 20 (2006): 241-6.
Lundestad, Geir. “Why Does Globalization Encourage Fragmentation?” International Politics 41 (2004): 265-276
Markel, Matthew W. "The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes (3 Volume Set)." Parameters: US Army War College 36: 129-34.
Matthew, Richard, and George Shambaugh. "The Pendulum Effect: Explaining Shifts in the Democratic Response to Terrorism." Analyses of Social Issues & Public Policy 5.1 (2005): 223-33.
Mazzetti, Mark. “Qaeda Is Seen as Restoring Leadership.” New York Times April 2, 2007
Nye Jr., Joseph S. "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy." Political Science Quarterly 119: 255-70.
Packer, George. "Knowing the Enemy." New Yorker 82.4 (2006): 60-9.
Pelley, Scott. “Terrorists Take Recruitment Efforts Online.” CBS: SIXTY MINUTES http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/02/60minutes/main2531546.shtml?source=search_story (March 4, 2007)
Qin, Jialun, et al. "Analyzing Terror Campaigns on the Internet: Technical Sophistication, Content Richness, and Web Interactivity." International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 65 (2007): 71-84.
Reid, Julian. "The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: A Critique of the 'Return of Imperialism' Thesis in International Relations." Third World Quarterly 26 (2005): 237-52.
Ronfeldt, David. “Today's wars are less about ideas than extreme tribalism.” The Christian Science Monitor March 27, 2006 edition.
Salhi, Ribhi. “Borderless Terror In Global World: The Driving Forces of building Alqaeda.” Conference Papers -- Midwestern Political Science Association, 2004 Annual Meeting (2004): 1-24.
Santiago, Tony. “Political risk could cost world economy $1 trillion -- Report puts price tag on terror, other geopolitical issues affecting business.” Electronic Engineering Times (2004): 34.
Satanovsky, Evgeny. "International Terrorism: A very Long Fight." International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations 52 (2006): 40-51.
Scholte, Jan Aart. Globalization: A Critical Introduction. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
Thompson, Clive. "Open-Source Spying. (Cover Story)." New York Times Magazine 156.5378 (2006): 54-106.
Weber, Steven, et al. "How Globalization Went Bad." Foreign Policy.15 (2007): 48-54.


* From here on to be referred to as “jihadism” – proponents of which are “jihadists”
* See attachments; Cooper substantiates this as well.
* Of course, most people experience all these reactions to some degree – and can live in peace as such.
* “Ummah” roughly means Muslim community.
* The actual degree to which bin Laden and his followers believe this is obviously uncertain, but such a view is certainly evidenced by their propaganda.
* It is imperative to note that, despite conventional wisdom, most jihadist terrorists do not come from the poor working classes. Nonetheless, it is among the poor working classes and agrarian tribal societies that they enjoy the most popular support – hence the difficulty of catching Osama bin Laden and of ridding Iraq of insurgents. Of course, it is also true that financial support from rich Muslims is crucial. My point here is mainly that poor economic conditions provide fodder for jihadi propaganda.
* This is true in terms of transnational mobilization. Lieutenant Colonel Matthew W. Markel reminds us that “terrorists use the Internet to screen potential recruits, but still rely on personal contact to complete the recruitment process.” (Markel, 2006: 131)
* “Mujahideen” in Arabic roughly translates to “holy warrior.”
* Though it does not make any explicit declarations like the others, its rhetoric is noticeably similar.
* David Kilcullen, Australian Political Anthropologist who helped the Pentagon author a new counterinsurgency doctrine, quoted in an article by George Packer in “The New Yorker,” 2006.
* Of course, this is only in theory: Recent atrocities in Sudan prove that – in practice – the international community is not so quick to intervene.
* For more information on this, see: http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370280